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ABSTRACT

Public policies in France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are compared with regard to quantitative developments in higher education. The analysis is focused on the issue of private versus social demand, but more detailed aspects of quantitative planning also are addressed. The following question is discussed: why Sweden adopted a system of quantitative planning in higher education that included a system-wide "numerus clausus" largely based on social demand, while France and the United Kingdom continued to rely mainly on private demand? Five possible determinants are examined: financial resources, national planning traditions, "issue webs," policy inheritances, and specific policy processes. The effectiveness of the governments in predicting and meeting private demand is analyzed, and the record in areas where manpower planning has been attempted is examined. (SW)



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# HOW MUCH HIGHER EDUCATION IS ENOUGH? PUBLIC POLICY IN FRANCE, SWEDEN AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

by

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## Introduction

There is considerable agreement in the literature that quantitative growth has been a crucial force behind the transformation of higher education systems in recent decades. To quote a representative statement on the subject:[1]

> The most important single pressure bearing on institutions of higher education has been the well-known and generalized phenomenon of the 'explosion of numbers'. Enrollments doubled or even trebled in the course of the late 1950s and early 1960s, and policy makers and academics became aware that emerging problems could not be solved merely by enlarging institutions and by following the past policies of providing 'more of the same'. Quantitative expansion generated new, qualitative problems.

In view of this importance of growth as an independent variable affecting almost every facet of higher education, it should come as no surprise to learn that growth-related issues have indeed been politically salient in most countries of Western Europe. Typically such issues seem to have dominated the policy agenda until student demands in the late 1960s made problems of governance and "order" the top priorities of many governments.

Granted the fundamental importance of quantitative developments in higher education, it ought to be of considerable interest to investigate how governments have coped with problems in the area. It may be argued that if they had little or no control over the size of their systems, little else could be effectively accomplished in higher education policy.

Obviously a very large number of government measures may affect, however indirectly, the size of a country's higher education system. They seem to range from general economic and social policies having an impact on the possibility for individuals to forego earnings during an extended period of study, to educational policies determining the number of people qualified to enter institutions of higher education, to policies directly related to higher education, such as admission regulations. In order to provide a necessary focus for the following analysis, we have chosen to conceptualize the major policy problem that governments face in the quantitative planning of higher education as a choice between two basic approaches. On the one hand they may rely on the demand for places in higher education institutions expressed by qualified individuals; this is what may be termed a private demand approach. On the other hand governments may decide to provide places according to some definition of society's needs for qualified people; this is in the sequel referred to as a social demand approach.[2] These two approaches, although analytically separable, represent in real life the end points of a continuum rather than discrete alternatives. Governments in Western Europe have typically used both approaches: in some areas of higher education student numbers have been restricted with reference to a limited social demand (and limited resources) while enrollments in other areas have been determined on the basis of private demand.

The two planning approaches pose different analytical problems. The main task within the framework of the private demand approach is, of course, to forecast future levels of demand. The record shows that this has been a difficult task indeed.

If a social demand approach is adopted in quantitative planning some conception--explicit or implicit--of society's needs for different types of

graduates is needed. This analysis can of course be performed in a very crude and ad hoc way in response to perceived imbalances in the labor market. However, there are also more sophisticated techniques available. The chief alternative is manpower planning, characterized as "the leading method throughout the world for integrating education and economic planning."[3] In brief summary, it attempts to specify a desired future manpower structure in terms of the number of people needed with specific skills, and further to determine the educational output that will match the manpower structure. The major difficulty involved is the forecast of the future manpower requirements; due to the nature of higher education a long-term perspective is necessary: at least ten, possibly fifteen or twenty years.

A partly competing technique is commonly termed the rate-of-return approach. It purports to tell policy makers how socially profitable investments in various public programs are. It has been fairly extensively used in many countries to calculate the return to investments in different educational programs and levels. Perhaps the major problem with the technique is the starting assumption it has to make that the current distribution of income is largely equitable.[4]

* * *

The aim of this paper is to compare public policies in three nations--France, Sweden and the United Kingdom--with regard to quantitative developments in higher education. In terms of the foregoing discussion the analysis is focused on the issue of private versus social demand, but we will necessarily deal with more detailed aspects of quantitative planning as well. To begin with, an overview is provided of how policies have developed in the three countries; against this backdrop an effort is made to explain why policies developed the way they did; and, finally, there follows

a brief discussion of the impact of public policy on quantitative developments in higher education. First of all, however, we have deemed it useful to review briefly the actual quantitative developments in higher education in France, Sweden and the United Kingdom during recent decades.

## An Overview of Quantitative Developments

The general pattern is well known. During the postwar period student numbers have grown rapidly in all countries of Western Europe. France, Sweden and the United Kingdom are no exceptions, but on closer inspection they display considerable variation.

First, their overall growth has varied. Sweden's student population increased six-fold in the period 1950-1975, that of France five-fold, while students in the U.K. became four times as many during the 25 year period.

Further, the rate of growth at different points in time has varied greatly, as may be seen from Table 1 below:[5]

Table 1. Student enrollments in higher education: Average annual growth rates in France, Sweden and the U.K. 1950-1975.

| | 1950-55* | 1955-60 | 1960-65 | 1965-70 | 1970-75 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| France | 3.8 | 6.1 | 13.2 | 9.8 | 5.3 |
| Sweden | 6.3 | 7.1 | 14.2 | 12.7 | -0.7 |
| U.K. | 1.5 | 7.0 | 8.2 | 6.8 | 2.3 |

* University-type institutions only

All three countries experienced the most rapid growth during the 1960s. In fact, in all three the peak years occurred in 1966-1968. In the 1970s the picture is very different with much lower growth rates than in the preceding decade. For Sweden, which was number one in expansion rate in all of Western Europe during 1950-1965, the change is particularly abrupt;

the first half of the 1970s saw an actual decline in student numbers. However, from the mid-1970s Sweden again experiences modest growth.[6]

While French higher education expanded somewhat slower than Sweden's in the 1950s and 1960s, it continued, by way of contrast, to grow at an average rate of about five percent during the first half of the 1970s. However, this represented only half the growth rate of the 1960s. The most recent data concerning student enrollments in France show a markedly lower rate of expansion from 1977.[7]

The United Kingdom was lagging considerably behind the other two in the early 1950s and in the 1960s. For all of higher education there was probably an actual decrease in the student population in the early 1950s, and not the moderate increase shown for universities in Table 1. In parallel with France but unlike Sweden, growth continued during the early 1970s, albeit at a lower pace than before. Recent information on developments in the United Kingdom indicates, as in the French case, a slackening of demand.[8]

This variable expansion rate in higher education has resulted in different levels of participation. To appreciate this, we need a comparison of the student population with some larger group. In Table 2 data is presented on the number of students in the three countries per 1000 inhabitants:[9]

Table 2. Number of students in higher education per 1000 inhabitants in France, Sweden and the U.K. 1950-1975.

| | 1950 | 1955 | 1960 | 1965 | 1970 | 1975 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| France | 4.2 | 4.7 | 6.3 | 10.3 | 15.8 | 19.6 |
| Sweden | 3.1 | 3.7 | 6.0 | 10.0 | 17.6 | 19.6 |
| U.K. | 3.3 | 4.0 | 5.4 | 7.9 | 10.8 | 12.8 |

As may be seen from the table the three countries are, in fact, strikingly similar before 1960. It is the much lower expansion rate during the 1960s

which leaves the United Kingdom behind the other two countries. In the 1970s this gap is well established, and the U.K. shows no tendency to catch up.

## An Overview of Policy Developments

As was mentioned earlier the problems and opportunities associated with rapid expansion were the most frequently discussed topics in the public debate over higher education in many countries during the 1950s and 1960s. This certainly seems to have been the case in France, Sweden and the United Kingdom. This said, there is a noticeable lack of coherence in both discussions and policy measures. Typically the problem of size in higher education has not been attacked frontally but, rather, has been avoided or dealt with in various indirect and piecemeal ways. From the following overview of policy developments in each of the three countries we will *inter alia* learn that Sweden in the late 1970s provides an exception to this rule.

*Policy developments in France*. Of the three countries France has undoubtedly experienced most difficulties in its efforts to cope with the pressure of numbers in higher education. A sense of crisis developed throughout the 1960s and when the May revolt occurred in 1968 most observers agreed that it was to a large extent an "*effet de nombre*" or, rather, an effect of the government's failure to cope with rapid expansion.[10]

Student numbers in French universities depended exclusively on private demand. The policy was as old as the Napoleonic University itself. An imperial decree of March 17, 1808 had determined that the *baccalauréat* would serve a dual purpose: it marked the end of the *lycée* studies and it constituted the first university degree. Everyone who passed it was, in other words, automatically entitled to study at the university level.[11]

By contrast, the other major set of institutions in French higher education, the grandes écoles (enrolling about ten percent of all students), have traditionally been highly competitive and have expanded only in response to perceived social demand. However, the future needs for the (mostly) elite professions trained in the grandes écoles have typically not been determined as part of a central scheme for manpower planning but, rather, in a fairly decentralized (implicit or explicit) bargaining process between government and professional networks.[12]

The national Plan in France seems to have had little impact on quantitative developments in higher education. The first few Plans were limited to investment planning on the basis of projections of private demand. Later Plans have engaged in the forecasting of manpower needs but only in very gross terms. In general, the Plan seems to have added little to the regular planning of the Ministry. And only outside the university sector have these efforts been of direct consequence to policy. Perhaps the prime example is teacher training where projections of demographic changes have prompted a sharp reduction in the provision of places in recent years.[13] Calculations of the social return in specific areas have been undertaken, but as far as we know they have had little or no impact, i.e. apart from strengthening the conviction that overall investments in the grandes écoles were much more profitable than those made in the university sector.

The major overhaul of the French universities in 1968 implied virtually no change in the area of quantitative planning. No numerus clausus was adopted in the university sector, and the grandes écoles were almost entirely outside the reform process. In the post-1968 period no major change has occurred. However, some commentators argue that a number of

small measures are beginning to constitute a trend. In particular, they point to the adoption of a numerus clausus for medical education in 1971, as well as for pharmacy and some minor areas later, and also an alleged effort by the government to force institutions to restrict admissions through a financial squeeze.[14]

Policy developments in Sweden. Traditionally the Swedish system of higher education had one (smaller) part with restricted admission and another (larger) part that was open to all applicants who had successfully passed their studentexamen. The former encompassed most educational programs with a pronounced professional content, viz. medicine, dentistry, technology, business administration and teaching, while the "free faculties," as they were called, included social sciences, humanities and most natural science disciplines.

In the course of the 1970s, public policy in Sweden has developed toward the acceptance of a numerus clausus for the entire postsecondary sector. The original framework for the new system of quantitative planning was developed within the U68 commission. As put forward in the commission's main report in 1973, the main ideas can be outlined as follows.[15] There are three major factors which ought to be considered in the quantitative planning of higher education. First, there is the private demand of qualified individuals as expressed in their applications for places. The level of this demand is obviously affected by government measures, and the manipulation of it, for instance in order to further social justice, is perfectly legitimate.

The second major factor to take into account is society's need for manpower. Forecasts of future needs for academics had been undertaken since the 1930s in Sweden, and on a regular basis since the early 1960s.

According to the U68 commission, the Swedish as well as the foreign experience in this area warranted the conclusion that no detailed fit could be achieved between manpower needs and individual programs in higher education. Rather, forecasts should be aimed at depicting trends in very broad sectors of the economy. The commission proposed a scheme where the labor market for graduates from postsecondary institutions was divided into five categories: technical professions; administrative, economic and social professions; medical and nursing professions; teaching professions; and cultural and informative professions. This scheme was to be reflected in the organization of national planning.[16]

Following quite extensive research the U68 explicitly rejected the idea of basing quantitative planning on the rate-of-return approach.

Thirdly, available financial resources should set a limit on quantitative developments in higher education. The allocation of public money must everywhere be politically controlled, not as was largely the case in higher education in the 1960s, resulting from the vagaries of private demand.

None of these factors--private demand, social demand as determined by manpower forecasting, and available resources--was automatically more legitimate than any other: the weight of each was to be determined in the political process. What the new system for quantitative planning would accomplish was to create the opportunity for such conscious processes. The lack of a system-wide numerus clausus had prevented this under the old system. As will be shown in more detail later, the planning system as proposed by the U68 was to begin with only partially implemented. However, from 1979 onwards Swedish higher education will be planned pretty much in the manner envisaged by the U68 in the early 1970s.

Policy developments in the United Kingdom.

When the period of rapid growth began in British higher education in the late 1950s there was little in the form of a coherent philosophy with regard to quantitative planning. National admission policy was simply the sum of institutional policies which were the sum of departmental policies. About 1960, however, the private demand for university places reached a level where institutions had to reject increasing numbers of applicants. This development was a major impetus behind the appointment in 1961 of a Committee on Higher Education under the chairmanship of Lord Robbins.

The report of the Robbins Committee in 1963 dealt extensively with quantitative planning and it provided the fundamental principles on which public policy in the area still rests in the United Kingdom. In brief summary, these principles implied that "courses of higher education should be available for all those qualified by ability and attainment to pursue them and who wish to do so."[17] The number of places should grow at a pace which accommodated a roughly constant proportion of the graduates from secondary education, as expressed by the private demand for places.

The Robbins report rejected the possibilities of basing quantitative planning on manpower forecasting, chiefly on the grounds that the technical difficulties involved were too great. At the same time, the Committee report seemed to accept[18]

> . . . two of the central assumptions of manpower forecasting, namely that there is an identifiable link between the qualifications of workers and their level of output, and that economic growth targets give rise to a 'need' or 'requirement' for particular types, and numbers, of qualified workers.

Manpower forecasts for particular professions had been undertaken already in the interwar period, and from the 1950s onwards one may speak of manpower

planning in some areas, especially medical education and teacher training. As in France and Sweden, but probably even more so, policy makers in the United Kingdom assumed that there was a lack of scientific and technological manpower. This was viewed as an important explanation of the country's economic debacle. In the 1960s specific targets were established concerning the proportion of new places in higher education that should be in the natural sciences and technology.[19]

In the 1970s, however, it seems as if the articulate opponents of manpower forecasting have succeded in convincing policy makers that anything resembling manpower planning is both impossible and outright dangerous. Correspondingly, the rate-of-return approach seems to have evoked more serious consideration in the United Kingdom than in either France or Sweden. For example, recent efforts to reduce the number of postgraduate students have partly been based on calculations of the social profitability of investments at this level.

* * *

France, Sweden and the United Kingdom have all, then, relied on both private and social demand in the quantitative planning of their higher education systems. In France the universities have remained open to the private demand of bacheliers, while the grandes écoles, by contrast, have been expanded on the basis of perceived social demand (as well as pressures exerted by powerful professions). Manpower planning has been of importance only with regard to elite professions and teachers.

Since the Robbins report, public policy in the United Kingdom has aimed at satisfying all private demand for places in higher education (not necessarily in universities). Manpower considerations have, as in France, been of particular importance in relation to elite professions and teacher training. The emphasis on science and technology has been strong indeed

in the policy rhetoric in the United Kingdom.

Sweden is the deviant case. To be sure, this was not so to begin with. Traditionally there was a larger sector practicing open admission to all qualified school leavers, while programs training elite professions and teachers were restricted. In a prolonged process, however, this system has been abandoned in favor of a numerus clausus covering the entire postsecondary sector. Manpower considerations are to be applied in the quantitative planning of the entire sector, although their importance should certainly vary from one area to the next: private demand and resource constraints are often equally legitimate factors.

## Policy Determinants

The aim of this section of the paper is to depict some of the factors explaining the variation in policy developments in the three countries. To make this task manageable, we concentrate our efforts on answering the following specific question: Why did Sweden adopt a system of quantitative planning in higher education that included a system-wide numerus clausus largely based on social demand, while France and the United Kingdom continued to rely mainly on private demand? In providing a preliminary answer it seems worthwhile to discuss at least five kinds of possible determinants: financial resources; national planning traditions; "issue webs"; policy inheritances; and specific policy processes.

Financial resources. "Apart from electronics and natural gas, higher education has probably expanded faster than any other major industry in the 1960s."[20] This characterization of higher education growth in the United Kingdom may serve to illustrate the fact that the sector's rate of growth was not only impressive when compared to earlier times but also in comparison with

almost any other sector of society. It was hardly surprising, then, that policy makers in all three countries soon began to worry about the costs of expansion.

At first glance one might expect these worries to be particularly justified in France and Sweden where the higher education systems grew so much faster in the 1960s than in the United Kingdom. On closer inspection, however, it becomes evident that, on the contrary, the financial burden of expansion was heavier in the United Kingdom than in either France or Sweden, essentially for two reasons.

First, the British economy entered a stage of acute crisis already in 1966. A few years elapsed before this seriously began to affect public spending in higher education. The first obvious sign came in 1969 when the then Minister of State responsible for higher education, Shirley Williams, proposed a number of austerity measures, referred to as the "13 Points."[21] When a new quinquennial grant for the universities was negotiated in 1972 it was obvious that the following five years would be less affluent than the preceding five-year period. However, hardly a year had passed when in late 1973 the United Kingdom was hit with the deepest economic crisis so far in the postwar years, partly caused by the international oil crisis and partly due to domestic events such as a miners' strike. The promise made to universities that they were to be compensated for inflation was quickly withdrawn; considering that the inflation rate at the time ran at close to 30 percent in the United Kingdom this was indeed a major blow to university finances. In 1975 the acute crisis eased considerably, and in the late 1970s higher education seems to be treated fairly generously, and perhaps even make up somewhat for some of the losses in 1973-74.[22] In France and Sweden, the economic crisis followed directly upon the oil crisis in 1973. In the Swedish case, one may even

doubt if "crisis" is the right word for what occurred. In France the situation was more akin to that of the United Kingdom; public expenditures on higher education were actually decreasing in real terms in 1974 and 1975, even to a point where the question was raised whether universities could go bankrupt.[23] In Sweden the situation may be characterized as a "steady state" with regard to finances during this period: institutions were compensated for inflation, but only barely so. In the late 1970s the new emphasis on the importance of research as well as increasing student numbers have brought about a new period of financial growth in Swedish higher education, although this time at a very moderate pace.[24]

A second reason why the lower growth rate in terms of student numbers in the United Kingdom has not meant a less heavy financial burden becomes evident when costs per student are compared. In Table 3 some of the scarce comparative data on higher education finances are included.[25]

Table 3. Public Expenditures on Higher Education in France, Sweden and the United Kingdom

| | France | Sweden | The U.K. |
|---|---|---|---|
| a. Expenditures in Percent of Gross National Product | | | |
| 1960 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.5 |
| 1965 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.8 |
| 1970 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 1.2 |
| b. Average Annual Growth Rates 1960-1970 | 25.3 | 22.3 | 19.3 |
| c. Expenditures Per Student U.S. $ 1970 | 864 | 2179 | 2323 |

The outstanding fact illustrated in this table is the difference in costs per student in the United Kingdom and Sweden on one hand and France on the other. In financial terms the expansion in the United Kingdom was

almost as burdensome as that of France or Sweden. And if we are to believe these comparative data, the British spend twice as much on higher education as France in terms of the proportion of GNP.

All things considered, then, the analysis of financial constraints does not seem to contribute to an explanation of policy development. If anything, Sweden has fared best and should, consequently, have experienced the least pressure to curb private demand.

Planning traditions. A review of the national "aptitudes for planning"[26] in the three countries seems to point at the United Kingdom as "the deviant case." France and Sweden are both considered to be generally more prone to central planning.[27] In the French case there is, of course, the famous (or infamous) national Plan, while Sweden adheres to a less grandiose and more pragmatic scheme in its planning effort.

Education is perhaps the policy area where the differences are most pronounced. Here the long-standing tradition of decentralization in the United Kingdom--whether it takes the form of university autonomy or of local authority responsibility for schools--provides an important contrast with France and Sweden. This is still true, but less so, in the late 1970s following the recent movement towards decentralization in both the French and the Swedish case.[28]

The doctrine of the Department of Education and Science in the United Kingdom has traditionally prescribed a very limited role for central planning in education. The top civil servant in the DES for many years, Sir William Pile, has characterized its approach as "pragmatic, conservative, and evolutionary."[29] Its role is to identify existing trends and then act in anticipation of them. The chief planning activities of the Department have been projections of private demand in the long-term perspective and the

planning of expenditures in the medium-term perspective.[30]

Manpower planning on a broad scale has certainly been alien to the DES. When Lord Crowther-Hunt in 1975, as Minister of State for Higher Education, made a series of speeches advocating more of manpower planning in the DES he was met with an outcry from large parts of academia and a perhaps equally telling silence on the part of other central policy makers. It was made clear to him that he had stepped out of the bounds of the DES doctrine.[31]

Departmental compartmentalization as a hindrance to comprehensive planning is obviously a problem in all three countries. It has been pointed out, however, as a special problem in the British setting.[32] In regard to manpower planning this has been evident in a jurisdictional conflict between the DES and other participants, in particular the Department of Industry and the Manpower Services Commission. The latter have generally been more positive toward manpower planning as a legitimate and important governmental undertaking.[33]

Judging from this brief analysis of national planning traditions, the United Kingdom would be expected to be least inclined to adopt a social demand approach to quantitative planning in higher education while France and Sweden appear as inseparable in this regard.

"Issue webs." Cynthia Enloe has, in her comparative analysis of the politics of pollution, advanced the concept of "issue webs":[34]

> Issues rarely exist in a vacuum. Rivalries for scarce resources, multiple interests possessed by the same group, cultural and ideological linkages between values--each serves to attach one issue to several others. The web of issues into which (a specific issue) falls will influence the way in which it is debated and the kinds of social cleavages it provokes. This issue web may differ from country to country.

The major components in the "web" of issues linked with the issue of size in higher education may be graphically illustrated as follows:




Other issues may be included with equal right. When the size of the higher education budget grows, the sector becomes a real competitor to any other item in the overall budget.

However, the broad issues included in the figure have in a very direct sense been linked to the problem of size in higher education. The systems expanded on the basis of a widespread "ideology" arguing chiefly that growth would contribute very significantly to national competitiveness, economic growth, social equality and cultural development, and further that expansion would occur without a significant lowering of quality in higher education, without producing a surplus in the labor market, and generally without disruptions in the orderly life of academia. Research results in the sociology and economics of education seemed to support this set of views in important respects.[35]

Did this "expansionist ideology" vary markedly between the three countries? In general we would argue that it never reached the same heights in the United Kingdom as in the other two countries. To be sure, all elements were present and the expansionist mood certainly dominated in the 1960s. The Robbins Committee had very effectively argued in favor of rapid expansion.

But still there was probably a larger proportion in the British setting who had lingering doubts about the virtues of mass higher education than in either France or Sweden.[36] More precisely, the issue of social equality seems to have been given less emphasis in the United Kingdom while the opposite seems to have been true for quality as traditionally conceived.

Social equality had been an important issue in both French and Swedish higher education policy during the entire postwar period. Significant portions of the interested public and many policy makers regarded it even as a primary goal in the face of which virtually all other considerations would have to yield. More importantly, social equality and expansion were regarded as inextricably linked. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s a numerus clausus was in both countries perceived as anathema to the goal of social equality in higher education.[37]

Due to a combination of factors--including graduate unemployment, student unrest, slackening private demand, economic crisis, and new and contradictory research results--the "expansionist ideology" has been considerably eroded in all three countries in the 1970s. The relationships between the elements in the "issue web" of which expansion is a part are seen as much more complex and less certain. This is certainly true of the relationship between social equality and expansion. To illustrate the rising doubts, we may cite Anthony Crosland, British Secretary of State for Education and Science during the heydays of expansion (1965-1967). In 1974 he wrote:[38]

> . . . the Labour Government never resolved the baffling dilemma of what priority to give to higher education. For on the one hand its expansion allows some additional working-class children access to colleges and universities--an important gain. But the middle classes take the preponderance of extra places (in Communist as much as in Western countries); and in this sense the more that is spent on higher education, the more the poor are subsidizing the rich who benefit most from it.

It seems as if there is a variation between the countries to be noted here

with France and Sweden representing the contrasts. In France there is little evidence that a major change in this part of the "issue web" has occurred. A numerus clausus in the universities is still regarded by its opponents as a major blow to the goal of social equality. In Sweden, by contrast, the traditional champions of social equality in higher education, the Social Democrats and their allies in the bureaucracy and academia, have largely "disassociated" the two issues. We will investigate in more detail how this occurred later.

This very preliminary analysis of "issue webs" is certainly inconclusive on many counts. It seems, however, to justify two summary observations. First, the lower score of the United Kingdom on a scale of "expansionist ideology" would point to less resistance to measures to curb private demand there than in France or Sweden. Second, the continued and close association in France between the issues of social equality and the size of the higher education system has helped to prevent the introduction of a numerus clausus.

Policy inheritances. As Hugh Heclo has pointed out there is good reason to take into account the often "considerable impact of policy inheritances upon the substance of policy making."[39] Applied to the subject matter of this paper this insight would in particular point to the role of the baccalauréat and the grandes écoles in the French context.

The long-standing tradition of viewing the baccalauréat as a guarantee for entry to all parts of the French university is important in explaining policy developments in France. To be sure, the Swedish studentexamen was for long virtually the sole means by which one could gain entry to the universities, but it was less of a guarantee since all of the more prestigeous educational programs were restricted. From the late 1960s, successive policy measures in Sweden reduced its role; actually, the studentexamen

as traditionally conceived was abolished. In France the baccalauréat has been reformed to include less academic programs in upper-secondary education, but to abolish it would simply not be feasible.[40] In the United Kingdom the criteria by which students are judged fit to enter institutions of higher education have always been less clear. The individual institution has had the final word in the admission procedure, which normally has included statements from the applicant's school as well as personal interviews. The criterion as established in the early 1960s (two "A" levels in the General Certificate of Education, GCE) for full student grants was more an approximate norm than a sacred rule.

The existence of the grandes écoles as a separate sector in France has been crucial to the feasibility of keeping the universities open to private demand. These schools (not all of them, but many) are the most important training grounds for all kinds of elites in French society. As long as their functioning has been guaranteed the need to control overall quantitative developments in French higher education has been less strongly felt. Although much has been said about an integration of the grandes écoles and the universities--this is the public position of the French Left--virtually nobody seems to argue that the schools, even when formally part of the universities, should be open to private demand.

Our point here is that while France had a policy inheritance that implied a social demand approach in one sector (the grandes écoles) and a private demand approach in another (the universities), this was not the case in Sweden or the United Kingdom. There, by contrast, the cleavage cut across the universities: some subjects or programs were restricted while others were not.

To summarize, the policy inheritances in the French context associated with the baccalauréat and the sharp contrasts between the grandes écoles and

the universities partially explain why France in the face of enormous pressure has continued to rely on private demand in quantitative planning.

Policy processes. Our discussion here will focus on the process leading up to the adoption of the new policy for quantitative planning in Sweden, but we will also take note of some aspects of the policy process in France.

The process in Sweden covers more than a decade.[41] During the 1960s there was little disagreement over the wisdom of established policy. The "free faculties" were viewed as essential both by contributing to social equality and by providing flexibility in meeting the requirements of a rapidly changing labor market. The Social Democratic Minister of Education of this period, Ragnar Edenman, repeatedly defended the system along those lines in response to increasing internal criticism from, above all, the Ministry of Finance. The public position of the government remained unchanged throughout the 1960s and the first few years of the 1970s.

But the groundwork for the future policy departure was laid in this period. With the benefit of hindsight we can see how both the terms of reference of the U68 commission and its composition clearly pointed to the future proposal for a new system of quantitative planning. However, the adoption of the proposal as government policy was in no way an automatic process. Instead, what occurred must be explained in terms of the presence of divergent views within the Social Democratic leadership in the higher education area. The outcome of this intraparty dispute was indeed very uncertain, at least until late 1973.

The Minister of Education, Ragnar Edenman, resigned in 1967. He was replaced by Olof Palme, a former chairman of the Swedish Union of Students and the future Prime Minister. At about the same time, however, a new post as Minister of Higher Education was created. It was largely a personal

appointment of the top civil servant of the Ministry of Education, Sven Moberg, an official with known Social Democratic sympathies and political ambitions. He had been a close associate of Edenman for several years and shared all the basic assumptions of the Minister's view on quantitative planning. This was, however, not true of Moberg's successor as Under Secretary of State in the Ministry of Education, Lennart Sandgren. Sandgren was appointed to chair the U68 after being the principal author of its terms of reference.

Although the directives to the U68 did not explicitly favor a system-wide numerus clausus it was posed as a very real alternative--something which hardly reflected the opinion at the time.[42] The emphasis on quantitative planning for the labor market also pointed in this direction. Of importance was also the stress on a planning approach which covered the entire post-secondary sector. The adoption of that perspective probably contributed to the view that quantitative planning exclusively on the basis of private demand was an anomaly.

The experience and positions of the members of the commission also seem relevant. Without entering details, we may note that the core was composed of four top level bureaucrats, three of whom had had their major experience in school administration and planning. Various interest groups, including politicians, were represented in three reference groups. The representation of traditional academic views was very weak.[43]

The publication of the main report from the U68 in 1973 forced a showdown within the Social Democratic leadership. The Minister of Higher Education resigned, and the commission's view on quantitative planning was accepted as government policy despite immediate and intense criticism from a large part of academia.

However, the Social Democrats were in a minority position in the Riksdag and had to engage in coalition-building. Since the Communists were opposed to most aspects of the U68 reform package, the government had to turn to one of the non-socialist parties. After a period of uncertainty--when the alternative option of abandoning the whole idea of a large-scale reform was in fact seriously contemplated--the Social Democrats succeeded in persuading the Center Party to rally behind a higher education reform. The Center Party did that for a number of reasons and against several concessions which we cannot detail here. Suffice it to note that the Party's acceptance of a new system of quantitative planning was to a large extent based on its concern for regional equality. A system-wide numerus clausus would make possible more purposeful allocation of resources to new institutions in remote areas. Considering the predictably slow growth of the resources going into higher education in the future, the Center Party deemed it necessary that the lion's share of them were aimed at these new institutions. However, they required concessions on the part of the Social Democratic government. Compared to the U68 proposal they wanted more consideration for private demand in quantitative planning, and a decentralization of decision-making power--while the central level decided on finances, the institutions should be given more leeway to determine the exact number of students.

To understand fully the acceptance by both the Social Democrats and the Center Party of a system-wide numerus clausus one has to remember that this was only one aspect, albeit a significant one, of a comprehensive higher education reform. Of particular relevance here is the parallel adoption of a new system of admission which was clearly designed to further social equality. In brief, the new policy implied the use of a quota system that was biased in favor of work life experience as a basis for admission. It

also contained possibilities of "positive discrimination" on social grounds in decisions at the level of institutions.[44] Altogether, so our argument goes, the new admission system facilitated the process of "disassociation" on the part of both the Social Democrats and the Center Party--both were strong adherents to the goal of social equality in higher education--of the issues of social equality and size.

The final version of the new planning system was to be adopted by the Swedish parliament in 1977. In the meantime, however, the Social Democratic government was ousted from power and replaced by a coalition formed by the three non-socialist parties, including the Center Party. As a result of internal negotiations between the three parties over the higher education reform, the Center Party had to make one major concession: its coalition partners secured a continuation of a "free sector" in higher education. Although the sector was considerably smaller than the "free faculties" of the old system, it still represented a major blow to the system of quantitative planning as adopted by the Riksdag in 1975 and originally proposed by the U68.

The new planning system with a "free sector" was put to work from mid-1977. In the eyes of the opponents the first year's experience confirmed their criticism: considerable administrative confusion had occurred and, more importantly, the resources poured into the "free sector" in order to satisfy unexpectedly high levels of private demand had foreclosed any substantial effort to develop higher education in new institutions and new locations.

The three-party coalition fell in October 1978, and the Liberals formed a single-party government. As soon as the Center Party was out it sided with the Social Democrats in the Riksdag and reinstituted the principles

agreed upon in 1975. From 1979 the new planning system will be in full operation.

In sum, it seems evident that several features of the policy-making process in Sweden facilitated the adoption of a new system of quantitative planning. The terms of reference and the composition of the U68 commission--where detailed policy formulation took place--were obviously biased in favor of a perspective on higher education largely borrowed from quantitative planning in the schools sector. Little reverence was shown for traditional academic viewpoints--both as they were laid down in inherited policy and as they were demonstrated (and continue to be demonstrated) in the opposition of many teachers and students in the institutions. A crucial factor in the policy adoption phase was the weight attached by the Center Party to regional equality: the new system was seen as necessary to progress in this area. Another facilitating factor was the parallel adoption of a new admission policy which according to its proponents was to be effective in creating more social equality in higher education.

In France the pattern of politics concerning a numerus clausus in the university sector has been remarkably stable during the entire postwar period. The Left and the Center have been opposed while at least a large proportion of the political Right has been in favor of restricted admission to the universities. Not unexpectedly in view of this distribution of opinions over the political spectrum, French governments during the Fifth Republic have typically been internally divided over the issue.[45] The process and contents of the Fouchet reforms of the mid-1960s (named after the Minister of Education at the time, Christian Fouchet) provide a good illustration. Initially, the proposed reforms contained what amounted to sélection at the entry of university studies, but in face of stern opposition from the university community as well as from leftist and centrist political forces

this element was largely removed from the reform package. What remained were curricular reforms and the creation of a new set of institutions, the Instituts Universitaires de Technologie (IUTs), largely intended to serve the purpose of diverting a share of the bacheliers from the university proper. What evidently had started out as an effort to cope with expansion has from that perspective been harshly judged in an OECD document:[46]

> Since the (Fouchet) reforms contain no specific measures to control total enrolments and their distribution, it would be pointless to try to assess their effectiveness in this field.

The problem of numbers continued to haunt the government and the idea of a numerus clausus for the university sector was in no way abandoned. In fact on the eve of the May revolt, the then minister of education (Alain Peyrefitte) had appointed a task force to deal with the problem. Its chairman was a well-known "selectionist," Jean Capelle. It is said that a proposal implying restricted admission to the universities was even cleared by President de Gaulle himself. With the outbreak of the student revolt the proposal was of course virtually dead, at least for the immediate future.[47]

The issue of sélection has continued to be highly controversial in the post-1968 period. The governments and their supporting parties have as earlier contained a share of members in favor of restricted admission to the universities, and it has taken a very vocal opposition, mostly of the Left and in the universities more generally, to prevent the proponents from winning out. One may seriously ask if not the sheer fact that the Left has been in opposition during the entire Fifth Republic does not go a long way toward explaining the stalemate in the area. Considering the magnitude of problems associated with university expansion in France, the impetus to restrict numbers would have been great for any government, even one of the Left.

* * *

In this section an attempt has been made to identify the major factors shaping the policy developments outlined in the foregoing section. More specifically, five sets of possible determinants have been analyzed to shed light on the fact that Sweden departed significantly from the common pattern in the 1970s. In brief summary, we first found that an analysis of the development of financial resources contributes little since the United Kingdom has been most severly hit in this regard. Secondly, the comparison of "planning traditions" in education and elsewhere turned out to be slightly more promising but did not really differentiate Sweden from France. Thirdly, a preliminary attempt was made to analyze the relevant "issue webs" in the three countries: in particular we observed that Sweden and France had had equally strong "expansionist ideologies" supporting the view that a numerus clausus would greatly endanger the goal of social equality in higher education. However, Swedish public policy "disassociated" the two issues in the 1970s. Fourthly, we stated that the "policy inheritances" of the baccalauréat and the grandes écoles posed particular barriers to reform in the French setting. Finally, it was argued in an analysis of the Swedish policy process that several features had been important in facilitating change: a change of leadership and the resolution of an intraparty dispute within the Social Democratic Party; the terms of reference and the composition of the U68; the successful coalition-building between the Social Democrats and a Center Party intent on distributing higher education resources more evenly over Sweden; the parallel, quite radical reform of the admission system which facilitated the process of "disassociation" described earlier; and the collapse of the three-party coalition in late 1978 which made it possible for the policy coalition between the Social Democrats and the Center Party to arise anew. In the French case we observed that there had been aborted attempts

to adopt a policy of sélection in the universities but that both internal cleavages within the government and the strong external opposition had prevented it so far.

## Policy Impacts

The policies investigated in this paper have obviously had some identifiable impact on quantitative developments in higher education; the dramatic quantitative developments recorded have furthermore, as we pointed out in the Introduction, had a considerable impact on almost every other aspect of higher education systems; and the transformation of higher education in recent decades has certainly had an impact on a plethora of other social institutions. Even a preliminary analysis of this extended chain of policy impacts represents a major and difficult undertaking, not even attempted here. Instead, the very modest aim of this section is to lay the groundwork for an analysis of the first order of impacts, i.e. the effectiveness of government measures in relation to quantitative developments. Since the new Swedish policy is too recent to be meaningfully assessed, the questions we ask are similar in all three cases: How well have governments performed in predicting private demand? In meeting private demand? What is the record in areas where manpower planning has been attempted?

Predicting private demand. In France forecasts on private demand have been made regularly within the framework of the Plans. From the Third Plan (1958-1961) onwards they have been quite sophisticated detailing levels of demand by faculty area, type of institution and region. How well have these forecasts predicted actual developments? In Table 4 we show the record of the Third and Fourth Plans:[48]

Table 4. Forecasts of university enrollments and actual enrollments in France. Third (1958-1961) and Fourth Plans (1962-1965).

| Year | Third Plan | Fourth Plan |
|---|---|---|
| 1957-58 | - 0.5 | |
| 1958-59 | + 1.1 | |
| 1959-60 | + 3.5 | |
| 1960-61 | + 5.3 | - 3.4 |
| 1961-62 | + 1.2 | - 5.6 |
| 1962-63 | - 5.8 | -10.7 |
| 1963-64 | -13.8 | -18.0 |
| 1964-65 | -16.6 | -16.9 |
| 1965-66 | | - 8.7 |

As may be seen from the table the problems started after 1962. Both the Third and the Fourth Plans grossly underestimated the future growth in university enrollments in the mid-1960s. The Fifth Plan (1966-1970) did a better job; it slightly overestimated growth in the late 1960s. The Sixth Plan (1971-1975) correctly predicted a slackening of private demand for the first half of the 1970s--but it underestimated that deceleration.[49]

In Sweden the U55 commission published forecasts of student enrollments in the late 1950s covering the period up to 1970. In just a few years' time, however, these were proved to be greatly inaccurate--the French pattern was repeated. A new commission, the U63, was appointed in 1963 to revise the plans and update the forecasts on student numbers. Although an assessment of the accuracy of the U63 forecasts poses some difficulties--the commission was very careful and named its products "examples," not genuine predictions, and it provided several such "examples" valid under different assumptions--it seems to have underestimated the expansion rate of the mid-1960s, and it certainly did not show any awareness of the dramatic downturn in private demand that was to occur from about 1970.

In the United Kingdom the Robbins Committee was seriously inaccurate in its forecasts of private demand in the medium-term perspective but,

ironically enough, fairly accurate about the long-term developments. As in France and Sweden, the onslaught of the mid- and late 1960s was greatly underestimated. The experience led the DES in 1970 to revise the predictions of private demand. While Robbins had predicted the student enrollment in full-time higher education to reach 558,000 in 1981, the DES 1970 Planning Paper increased that figure to 835,000. Another attempt was made in the 1972 White Paper entitled "Education: A Framework for Expansion"; this time the figure was slightly reduced to 750,000, a first sign that depression had finally hit higher education. In 1974 the predicted enrollment figure was down to 640,000, and in 1976 the DES forecast was 600,000. As 1981 is approaching it seems as if the actual enrollment will turn out to be very close to the Robbins figure advanced in 1963.[51]

In all three countries forecasters were also mistaken about the future distribution of students between different faculty areas. In general they predicted a much greater proportion of students in natural sciences and technology than was to be the case. In the United Kingdom Robbins estimated university growth fairly well, but underestimated the expansion rate in institutions of further education and colleges of education.[52] In France the new IUTs turned out to be much less attractive than the government had expected. The projected enrollment was 160,000 for 1972, i.e. roughly 25 percent of all university students. The actual figures were 35,000 students or 4.8 percent of the university enrollments.[53]

Meeting private demand. The comparison of forecasts with actual developments points, then, to a very poor performance on the part of planners in France, Sweden and the United Kingdom. An assessment of quantitative planning as a whole would, however, have to investigate the extent to which this (false) information was utilized in the relevant planning processes. Did it lead to

unwise decisions about investments in buildings and equipment? Or to a much less than optimal utilization of teaching resources? These are of course very difficult questions; we pose them here primarily in order to prevent too rash judgments about success and failure with regard to quantitative planning.

The general impression we have acquired in the course of this study is that governments in all three countries succeeded remarkably well in meeting private demand on a short-term basis. The criticism often levelled against higher education institutions for conservatism and a lack of flexibility is in our view refuted by events. Any social institution would experience difficulties in adjusting to the magnitude of change which occurred in higher education in the 1960s. There were many signs of overcrowding, particularly in France. What is less known, however, is that the teacher/student ratio actually improved in French universities before 1968. The problem was not so much that investments did not increase in parallel with student numbers but that the enormous investments made (as many places were created in the first decade of the Fifth Republic as had existed in 1958) were insufficient to make up for old sins.[54]

In Sweden the expansion of the "free faculties" went quite smoothly due to an "automatic" process of financing: the number of teaching hours was simply determined by the number of students according to different formulae for different subjects. When student numbers suddenly decreased significantly in the early 1970s this rule was abandoned however; had it been allowed to work, the result would have been the firing of large numbers of non-tenured teachers.

In the United Kingdom the success in meeting (its lower level of) private demand seems evident. To be sure, many academics now and then complain about a lowering of quality. Survey research has found that the share of

British university teachers who thought that student quality had declined increased from 21 percent in 1964 to 46 percent in 1974.[55] And, as in the other two countries problems appeared in graduate labor markets in the early 1970s.

Manpower planning. Manpower forecasts in all three countries in the 1950s and 1960s pointed to a considerable lack of graduates in the natural sciences and technology. In the United Kingdom targets were set up by the government with regard to the share of university students who should study in these areas. At one time the ambition was that two-thirds of new places created in the universities between 1962-63 and 1966-67 should be in these fields. The policy was a failure, however, since only 37 percent actually were enrolled there by the later date.[56] During the 1960s and 1970s a large number of places have not been filled, and since costs per place are high in many subjects, this has represented a considerable waste. To a lesser extent this type of overinvestment has occurred in Sweden in the 1970s as well. For example, some study programs in the colleges of technology have been unable to recruit a sufficient number of students.

As was mentioned above, all three countries have planned the provision of teachers in primary and secondary education according to forecasts of future needs of such manpower. At first glance this may seem as a fairly easy task considering the fact that in each of our countries central government has a considerable power over standards in schools, such as the teacher/pupil ratio. However, teacher training has a major drawback compared to other areas from the point of view of quantitative planning. In most other areas of higher education you know the demographics almost twenty years in advance, i.e. you know how large a specific age cohort is. In the case of teacher education the time perspective is evidently much shorter; in the

extreme case some six years for teachers in compulsory education.

The pattern has again been quite similar. In the 1960s there was a great lack of school teachers in the three countries. A Swedish study has shown that close to 40 percent of all graduates from higher education found employment in some part of the educational system (including higher education) during that decade.[57] Towards the end of the 1960s the market began to be saturated, and in the early 1970s the number of places had to be drastically cut in all three countries.

The most dramatic case is the United Kingdom. In particular from the mid-1960s the colleges of education expanded faster than any other part of higher education. This was in accord with the projections by Robbins, although as indicated earlier the Committee greatly underestimated the actual rate of growth. To illustrate: while the projected figure for 1967 was 26,400 (England and Wales only), the actual intake was 35,000.[58] The expansion continued well into the 1970s when the government suddenly announced plans for a drastic reduction. Somewhat ironically these intentions were made public in the earlier cited White Paper of 1972, "Education: A Framework of Expansion." The background was the dramatic drop in the birthrate from 1964 onwards. In what many commentators regarded as a very un-British way of doing things, the proposed scheme included amalgamations as well as closures of institutions. The implementation of the scheme turned out to be quite difficult, and so far the changes have been less radical than first anticipated.[59]

At approximately the same point in time--in 1971 or 1972--graduate unemployment became a visible problem in France, Sweden and the United Kingdom. To be sure, the level of unemployment never seems to have reached that of other people of the same age group but the novelty of the problem incited wide publicity.[60]

It is important to note, in the assessment of government performance that this unemployment far from affected all areas of higher education. Hardest hit were graduates from humanities and social sciences generally, and some specific groups from other areas. Only exceptionally did graduates from vocationally oriented programs experience lasting difficulties. Such exceptions were, for example, architects and librarians in Sweden. Sometimes the quite illogical argument is advanced that the graduate unemployment of the early 1970s points to the failure of manpower forecasting and planning. Governments may have failed to forecast correctly the actual needs of teachers, for example, but despite the difficulties in adjusting to the great variations in demand little actual unemployment occurred as a result among graduated teachers: that was largely a result of the effectiveness which governments had displayed in meeting the private demand for places in the less vocational areas of higher education, notably humanities and social sciences.

* * *

In this brief section we have demonstrated how governments in France, Sweden and the United Kingdom failed to foresee the scale of expansion in the 1960s as well as the slackening of private demand in the early 1970s. They were also inaccurate in their forecasts of the distribution of students between different fields, generally overestimating the proportion in science and technology. In all three countries the number of qualified school leavers was seriously underestimated in the 1960s, as was their propensity to go to higher education in the 1970s.

In view of this considerable failure on the part of governments to predict numbers accurately, it is easy to pass harsh judgments with regard to quantitative planning in its entirety in these countries. We argued, however, that in many respects it was a success story.

Quantitative planning according to manpower forecasts has a mixed record in the three countries. On the one hand it has sometimes led to considerable waste and to drastic fluctuations in policy. On the other hand, manpower forecasting was largely innocent of the graduate unemployment which hit all three countries in the early 1970s. To have prevented that, hindsight tells us that governments would have had to curb private demand in the less vocational areas of higher education.

## Concluding Remarks

To try to answer the question how much higher education is enough for a country in a certain period of its history is to stir up a host of both analytical and ideological issues. As we have seen the analytical problems primarily concern the possibility of forecasting accurately the private and the social demand for higher education. Another analytical problem, at least in principle open to disinterested research, concerns the actual benefits that can be expected from investments in higher education.

As always is the case, however, in important areas of public policy, there are also basic ideological issues involved. A good example concerns what appears to be a necessary trade-off between the principle of individual freedom of choice embodied in the private demand approach and the principle of political accountability for the spending of taxpayers' money associated with the social demand approach.

In the end the policy problems we have analyzed in this paper appear to have quite a general ring to them. In a large number of policy areas, there are trade-offs to be made between the requirements of orderly planning and political accountability on one hand and the demands of individuals to have access and to influence service levels on the other. To increase the knowledge about the character of such trade-offs in different policy areas seems to be

a worthwhile task for policy-oriented social research.

## Notes

[1] John H. Van de Graaff and Dorotea Furth, "Introduction" in Van de Graaff et al, Academic Power: Patterns of Authority in Seven National Systems of Higher Education (New York 1978), p. 7. Martin Trow has written a seminal paper on this topic, "Problems in the Transition from Elite to Mass Higher Education," prepared for an OECD Conference in June 1973.

[2] Our terminology follows that suggested in the following publications: The Planning of Higher Education: The Private Demand and The Planning of Higher Education: The Social Demand (Open University Press, 1977). The Robbins Report (cf footnote 17 below!) used the term "social demand" to denote what is here called "private demand" and it has had some followers, for instance some OECD reports. With the authors of the cited Open University publications we find Robbins' usage somewhat confusing.

[3] Mark Blaug, An Introduction to the Economics of Education (London 1973), p. 137.

[4] For very useful introductions to both techniques, see Vera Morris, "Education as a Social Investment" and Maureen Woodhall, "Manpower Planning and the Demand for Qualified Manpower," both in The Planning of Higher Education: The Social Demand.

[5] The figures for 1950-55, 1955-66 and 1960-65 are from the OECD publication Development of Higher Education 1950-1967 (Paris 1971), while those for 1965-70 and 1970-75 have been taken from the Unesco report Statistical Study on Higher Education in Europe (Bucarest 1978).

[6] This has particularly been the case from 1977. Cf. Rune Premfors, "The Politics of Higher Education in Sweden: Recent Developments (1976-1978)," Yale Higher Education Research Group, Working Paper no. 30, pp. 21-23.

[7] Actually the drop in the number of new entrants began in the Fall of 1976 and was then probably a response to the widespread student unrest during the Spring of that year. See Alain Bienaymé, Systems of Higher Education: France (New York 1978), pp. 4-5.

[8] The official statistics are slow in the United Kingdom. We base our observation on the reporting in the Times Higher Education Supplement.

[9] The data are again from the OECD (1950, 1955, 1960 and 1965) and Unesco (1970 and 1975) publications cited in footnote 5 above.

[10] Just to cite one discussion on this topic: Michelle Patterson, Conflict, Power and Structure: The Organization and Reform of the French University (Ph.D. diss., Yale University 1975), esp. ch. 5.

[11] Cf. e.g. Jürgen Schriewer, Die französischen Universitäten 1945-1968 (Bad Heilbrunn 1972), pp. 193-207, for a useful discussion of the baccalauréat.

[12] Approximately half of the grandes écoles are administered by the Ministry of Universities while the rest is under the purview of a large number of other ministries.

[13] This is true for all three countries; cf. the discussion on pp. 32-33 infra.

[14] See, for example, Jacques Fomerand, "The French University: What Happened after the Revolution?" in Higher Education 6(1977), pp. 103-104.

[15] The main report of the U68 commission is SOU 1973:2 Högskolan. An English summary has been published with the title Higher Education: Proposals by the 1968 Educational Commission (Stockholm 1973).

[16] Rune Premfors and Bertil Östergren, Systems of Higher Education: Sweden (New York 1978), ch. 4.

[17] Committee on Higher Education, Higher Education (HMSO, London 1963).

[18] Maurice Woodhall, "Manpower Planning and the Demand for Qualified Manpower" in The Planning of Higher Education: The Social Demand, p. 48.

[19] Cf. infra, pp. 32.

[20] R. Layard and J. King, "The Impact of Robbins" in G. Fowler, V. Morris and G. Ozga (eds.), Decision Making in British Education (London 1974), p. 227.

[21] For a detailed account of the "13 Points," see Times Higher Education Supplement, 22.10.76.

[22] For a useful account, see Peter Scott, "British Universities 1968-1978" in Paedagogica Europaea, XIII, 1978:2, pp. 29-43.

[23] Bienaymé, Systems of Higher Education: France, pp. 5-12 and 18-20, While the share of GNP of the higher education budget was 0.602% in 1969 it had declined to 0.409% in 1975 (ibid., Table 6, p. 9).

[24] Premfors and Östergren, Systems of Higher Education: Sweden, pp. 11-14 and Table A2, Appendix. While there was a slight increase in the higher education budget in constant prices during the 1970s, its share of GNP declines somewhat.

[25] The information in Table 3 is taken from Van de Graaff et al, Academic Power, Table A2, p. 210.

[26] On this concept, see Jack Hayward, "Change and Choice: The Agenda of Planning" in J. Hayward and M. Watson (eds.), Planning, Politics and Public Policy: The British, French and Italian Experience (Cambridge 1975), pp. 6-16.

[27] For a brief comparison of the two countries, ibid., pp. 47-48 (the chapter by Yves Ullmo "The national context: France").

[28] The efforts at decentralization in France and Sweden are assessed in Rune Premfors, "Public Policies for Institutional Governance in Higher Education: France, Sweden, and the U.K." (mimeo, Higher Education Research Group, Yale University, 1979).

[29] Educational Development Strategy in England and Wales (OECD, Paris 1975), p. 50. This OECD review of educational policy caused a quite intensive public debate over the role of DES. In particular it prompted a report by a parliamentary committee, Policy Making in the Department of Education and Science, Tenth Report from the Expenditure Committee (HMSO, London 1976), which is an extremely rich source on the whole spectrum of views on educational planning in the British context.

[30] In a recent and interesting effort the DES has tried to incite a public discussion on broad strategic choices in quantitative planning against the backdrop of the expectedly drastic fall in private demand in the early 1990s. A discussion document entitled "Higher Education into the 1990s" was issued in early 1978 and sent to a very large number of interested groups and institutions. For useful discussions of it, see Higher Education Bulletin, vol. 6, no. 2 (Summer 1978).

[31] Lord Crowther-Hunt developed his ideas in several speeches during 1975. Cf. also his statements to the earlier (footnote 29) cited parliamentary committee: Policy Making in the Department of Education and Science, pp. 419-448.

[32] Jack Hayward, "Change and choice: The agenda of planning," op. cit., pp. 6-7.

[33] For an account of the relationship between the DES and the Department of Employment, see Policy Making in the Department of Education and Science, pp. 396-418.

[34] Cynthia Enloe, The Politics of Pollution in a Comparative Perspective: Ecology and Power in Four Nations (New York 1975), p. 40.

[35] For an analysis of research influence in the British context, see Maurice Kogan, Educational Policy-Making: A Study of Interest Groups and Parliament (London 1975), esp. pp. 38-44 and 138-146.

[36] For a survey of the relevant attitudes in British academia in the mid-1960s, see A.H. Halsey and M. Trow, British Academics (Cambridge 1971), ch.11.

[37] Schriewer gives a very informative account of the public debate in France, cf. Die französischen Universitäten 1945-1968, esp. pp. 267-314. For comments on Sweden, see Premfors and Östergren, Systems of Higher Education: Sweden, ch. 3 and pp. 148-153.

[38] Anthony Crosland, Socialism Now (London 1974), pp. 20-21.

[39] Hugh Heclo, Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden (New York 1974), p. 63.

[40] Not that there are not exceptions to the rule that you need your "bac" to gain admission to an institution. For these, see Charles Fourrier, Les institutions universitaires (Paris 1971), pp. 99-103.

[41] A much more detailed account than is given here is found in Premfors, The Politics of Higher Education in Sweden: Recent Developments (1976-1978). In addition to the material included there I have drawn on several interviews conducted in 1977 and 1978.

[42] The public debate in Sweden is analyzed in Göran Andolf, Spärr vid universiteten? Debatten om dimensioneringen av den högre utbildningen 1957-1973 (Ministry of Education, Stockholm, DsU 1974:4).

[43] Furthermore, some of academia held very unrepresentative views.

[44] For more details on the new admission policy, consult Premfors & Östergren, Systems of Higher Education: Sweden, pp. 104-109 or Lillemor Kim "A New General Admissions Policy" in R.M. Pike et al, Innovation in Access to Higher Education (New York 1978), pp. 303-327.

[45] See for example Schriewer, Die französischen Universitäten 1945-1968, pp. 460-462.

[46] Innovation in Higher Education: French Experience before 1968 (OECD 1970), p. 46.

[47] Schriewer, Die französischen Universitäten 1945-1968, p. 460; interview with François Bourricaud, former member of the staff of Alain Peyrefitte on April 7, 1978. In 1974 another attempt was being made when the death of Pompidou and the subsequent change of government halted that process; see J. Fomerand, "The French University: What Happened after the Revolution?" p. 103.

[48] Development of Higher Education 1950-1967 (OECD, Paris 1971); adapted from Table VII-4, p. 211.

[49] Ibid.; on the Sixth Plan, see W.D. Halls, Education, Culture and Politics in Modern France (Oxford 1976), ch. 5.

[51] Layard and King, "The Impact of Robbins," passim, and Naomi McIntosh, "Access to Higher Education in England and Wales" in Pike et al, Innovation in Access to Higher Education, pp. 169-171.

[52] See p. 33, infra.

[53] John Van de Graaff, "The Politics of Innovation in French Higher Education: The University Institutes of Technology," Higher Education 5 (1976), p. 183.

[54] Habiba S. Cohen, Elusive Reform: The French Universities, 1968-1978, p. 18.

[55] A.H. Halsey, "Quality and Authority in British Universities" in Times Higher Education Supplement, 1.11.74.

[56] Layard and King, "The Impact of Robbins," pp. 240-241.

[57] Eskil Ekstedt, Utbildningsexpansion (Uppsala 1976), p. 166.

[58] Layard and King, "The Impact of Robbins," pp. 247-248.

[59] For one of many critical discussions, see Dav[illegible] Hencke, "Teacher supply: a case of manpower planning," Higher Educatio[illegible] Review 8 (1975/76):1, pp. 17-31.

[60] For a discussion of graduate unemployment in Sweden, cf. Premfors and Östergren, Systems of Higher Education: Sweden, pp. 142-147. The French situation is well analyzed in Guy Herzlich, "Le chomage des jeunes diplomés" Le monde de l'education, Novembre 1978.

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